Electronic Evidence in Swiss Criminal Procedure by Perrin, Bertrand et al.
70 Digital Evidence and Electronic Signature Law Review, Vol 8 © Pario Communications Limited, 2011
Dealing with cyber crime in Switzerland1
Notion of cyber crime 
The terms “computer crime”, “computer-related crime”
and “cyber crime” comprise a wide variety of new
phenomena, including new types of crime as well as
traditional crime committed in connection with
computer data and systems. The common denominator
and characteristic features of all of these offences can
be found in their relationship to computer systems or to
computer networks. The major substantive aspect of
this categorization is the relationship between crimes
and computer-based data or the relationship to
computer-based information.2
This paper examines electronic evidence in general.
Legal theorists have dealt at length with the question of
cyber crime, advancing various principles, particularly
on the subject of collecting and using evidence. These
principles are equally applicable, even if the computer
system is not connected to a network. The
developments set out below will apply, unless stated
otherwise, to cyber crime is the broad sense, namely, to
offences involving or which could involve the use of a
computer, with or without a network connection.
Council of Europe Convention on Cybercrime 
The Council of Europe adopted the Convention on
Cybercrime on 23 November 2001.3 The preamble of the
Convention indicates that the main objective is to
pursue a “common criminal policy aimed at the
protection of society against cybercrime, inter alia, by
adopting appropriate legislation and fostering
international co-operation”. Forty-seven States have
already signed the Convention (at the date of writing),
while sixteen countries still have to ratify it and set the
date for its entry into force.
On 18 June 2010, the Federal Government approved a
message proposing the ratification of this agreement by
the Swiss Parliament,4 and on 18 March 2011, the
Parliament adopted the Convention.5 It is the first
international treaty on criminal offences committed via
the internet and other computer networks, with
particular reference to copyright, computer-related
fraud, child pornography and network security. It also
provides for a series of procedural powers, such as the
search of computer networks and the interception of
content data.
In 2008, the Federal Government expressed the
opinion that Swiss legislation largely satisfied the
requirements imposed by this Convention.
Nevertheless, the government has mentioned the need
to adapt the rules of the Penal Code (PC)6 and the Law
on International Mutual Assistance in Criminal Matters
(IMAC)7 to bring them into line with the Convention.8 As
for the Swiss Code of Criminal Procedure (CCP), which
entered into effect on 1 January 2011, the Federal
Government, in a press release of 18 June 2010, stated
that no amendments were needed. According to the
statement, the new text fulfilled the requirements of the
Convention on Cybercrime.
In substantive law, the present Section 143bis PC
(“wrongful access to a computer system”) has been
amended and supplemented. As it stands now, it
punishes (upon an information being laid) anyone who,
without right, obtains access to a computer system
belonging to another which has been specially
protected by the owner of the computer or an employee
authorized to protect a computer or network. The
offender must have acted “without intention of self-
enrichment”. This requirement, which has been
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9 More specifically, it concerns the following data:
sender, recipient, date, duration, size and
itinerary of the communication.
10 On 1 January 2011, the position of investigating
magistrate has ceased to exist in Switzerland.
Conducting the preliminary inquiry and
prosecuting offences in connection with the
investigation rest exclusively with the Public
Prosecutor.
11 Rules are available on the web site of the Swiss
Coordination Unit for Cybercrime (CYCOS,
Cybercrime Coordination Unit) at
http://www.scoci.ch/cyco.php?language=en.
12 Message concerning the Council of Europe
Convention on Cybercrime, p. 42.
criticised by legal writers, has been abandoned.
Moreover, a new paragraph 2 will sanction anyone who
puts into circulation or renders accessible a password, a
programme, or any other data which he knows or ought
to know are to be used for the purpose of wrongfully
gaining access to a computer system, within the
meaning of the first paragraph. Thus the amendment
contemplated by the Federal Government should permit
the sanctioning of the illegal distribution of access
codes or other similar data which, in criminal law,
constitute acts in preparation of piracy. This new offence
will be prosecuted by its own motion.
As stated above, the Federal Law on International
Mutual Assistance in Criminal Matters has been
amended to make it compatible with the Convention
(new Article 18b IMAC). The fundamental change allows
the competent Swiss authorities for mutual assistance
in criminal matters to transmit computer traffic data9
before the conclusion of the mutual assistance
procedure. Authorisation to transfer such data in
advance is justified, provided that there is a close link
between the efficiency of the criminal prosecution and
the speed with which the requested information is
transferred. Nevertheless, this transmission to the
foreign authority is subject to strict conditions, and is
only permitted in two cases (article 18b(1)(a) and (b)
IMAC):
a) the interim measures indicate that the source of
the communication covered by the request is
located abroad, or
b) this data is collected by the executing authority
pursuant to an authorised real time surveillance
order.
The new provision also provides that data transferred in
this way cannot be used as evidence before the decision
on the granting of assistance has become final (article
18b(2) IMAC). Otherwise, in the event of appeal, they
could be excluded as evidence.
Swiss cyber crime authorities 
Jurisdiction for the prosecution of cyber crime rests with
the federal authorities (Federal Public Prosecutor), or
the cantonal authorities (cantonal public prosecutors10).
The scope of federal jurisdiction is governed by sections
23 (“Federal jurisdiction”) and 24 CCP (“Federal
jurisdiction in relation to organised crime, the financing
of terrorism and white-collar crime”). 
The judicial and police authorities of the cantons are
primarily responsible for the criminal investigation of
cyber crime in Switzerland. Computer crimes in the strict
sense, that is those which by definition are committed
with the aid of a computer, include misappropriation of
data (section 143 PC), unauthorised access to a
computer system (section 143bis PC), destruction of
data (section 144bis PC), fraudulent use of a computer
(section 147 PC), fraudulently obtaining a paying
computer service offered to the general public (section
150(3) PC). However, ordinary offences committed with
the aid of the internet or a computer, such as
representations of violence (section 135 PC), fraud
(section 146 PC), hard core pornography (section 197(3)
and (3bis) PC) offences against personal honour
(section 173 and following PC), racial discrimination
(section 261bis PC), infringement of copyright (section
67 LDA) and violation of trade or manufacturing secrets
(section 162 PC11) also fall within the scope of computer
crime.
On the national level, the Swiss Coordination Unit for
Cybercrime Control (CYCOS) is an entity that receives
reports from people who discover suspect web sites
and, where appropriate, forward the information to the
Swiss or foreign law enforcement authorities. It also
carries out its own research into illegal web site content.
Finally, this service monitors trends in internet crime
and issues periodical reports on the subject.
Article 35 of the Council of Europe Convention on
Cybercrime requires States to create points of contact
that are available at all times.12 These must facilitate
national and international criminal investigations into
cyber crime, particularly by acting as intermediaries
between the domestic and foreign authorities
responsible for these tasks. In Switzerland, the Federal
Office of Police (Fedpol) is responsible for this mission.
The Federal Office of Justice (FOJ) handles tasks relating
to mutual assistance and extradition.
The Swiss Code of Criminal Procedure Rules 
An historic change
The Swiss Code of Criminal Procedure entered into force
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on 1 January 2011. It is the culmination of a long process
of unification of criminal procedure, which until recently
was regulated by 26 cantonal statutes and by the
Federal Law on Criminal Procedure (LCP) of 15 June
1934.13 As of 1 January 2011, therefore, the substantive
criminal law (Swiss Penal Code) and the criminal
procedural rules (Swiss Code of Criminal Procedure) are
unified at the federal level. In general, this development
has been welcomed by practitioners, particularly by
members of the judiciary, since crime knows no
boundaries. Until now, the differences between the
many cantonal criminal procedures have primarily
benefited the very people that they were supposed to
prosecute.
Collection and use of electronic evidence 
Electronic evidence 
Electronic evidence (also known as digital evidence) is
any probative information in electronic form that can be
used as evidence in court. Electronic information can be
collected from the use of information material, the
recording and analysis of network traffic (such as
computer or telephone networks), or the examination of
digital copies (image copies, file copies).14
Rules for electronic evidence do not differ from
general rules of evidence. However, electronic evidence
has specific characteristics.15 First, it is often difficult to
report. This is particularly the case when a cybernaut
commits offences, but there is no trace left on his hard
disk.16 Secondly, electronic evidence can be altered
during its collection and when it is analysed. It is
therefore the responsibility of law enforcement
authorities, including the police, to ensure that the
evidence is preserved, and to document all stages of its
collection (continuity of evidence), as illustrated by
Julien Lhuillier and Anne-Sophie Peron-Verloove:
“Not only can technological media be very unstable, 
it can also be quickly obsolete, and it is the
responsibility of the people in charge of preserving
technological evidence to pay attention to the
maintenance conditions (optimum temperature,
humidity and light conditions; safe from fire, flooding,
infestations; away from any magnetic force that can
wipe out electronic data from the evidence media);
however they should also be concerned about being
able to use this evidence despite the lapse of time.”17
Personal conviction of the judge
Section 139(1) CCP stipulates that the criminal
authorities shall “employ every type of admissible
evidence which, based on the state of scientific
knowledge and experience, can serve to establish the
truth”. Swiss law contains no absolute limits on the
type of evidence that may be presented in court.
Criminal authorities can therefore use new evidence
resulting from scientific progress even if it does not
expressly feature in procedural law.18
In Swiss law, the principle of the personal conviction
of the judge (moral evidence system) is the corollary of
the freedom of evidence principle. Every element that
can prove a fact may be used. The judge assesses and
weighs up all the evidence in order to arrive at a
personal conviction. All evidence, even circumstantial,
can sway his conviction. His decision is dictated by his
conscience. He convicts or acquits according to whether
or not he is convinced of the guilt of the accused.19
However, his conviction must be arrived at reasonably
and he must provide a reasoned judgment,20 which
allows a review by the appeal authority. As a rule for
assessing evidence, the principle of ‘when in doubt, in
favour of the accused’ implies that the judge cannot
declare that he is convinced that the facts established
are adverse to the accused when an objective
assessment of all the evidence leaves serious and
ineluctable doubts as to the existence of such facts.21
The judge must not render an arbitrary decision. A
decision would be arbitrary if, when assessing the
evidence and establishing the facts, the judge fails to
take account, without a valid reason, of evidence that
could alter the decision, if he is obviously mistaken
about the meaning and scope of the evidence, or if,
based on the evidence collected, his findings are
untenable.22 
Search (sections 241-248 CCP)
“Search” is an extensive search for evidence, assets or
persons located in private premises, with or without the
13 RS 312.0.
14 For a definition of electronic evidence, see
Stephen Mason and Burkhard Schafer in Stephen
Mason, general editor, Electronic Evidence, (2nd
edn, LexisNexis Butterworths, 2010), 2.03.
15 For a discussion on the characteristics of digital
evidence, see Stephen Mason and Burkhard
Schafer in Electronic Evidence, Chapter 2.
16 Christiane Féral-Schuhl, Cyberdroit, Le droit à
l’épreuve de l’Internet, (Dalloz-Sirey, Paris
2009), p. 906.
17 Julien Lhuillier and Anne-Sophie Peron-Verloove,
“Cadre normatif et pratique de lutte contre la
cybercriminalité en Suisse”, in Lukas Heckendorn
Urscheler and Annelot Peters, editors, Swiss
Reports Presented at the XVIIIth International
Congress of Comparative Law, Geneva, Zurich and
Basel 2010, p. 315; note also the extensive
discussion of this topic in Electronic Evidence,
Chapters 1, 2, 3 and 4.
18 Message concerning the unification of criminal
procedure law, p. 1161.
19 Gérard Piquerez, Traité de droit pénal suisse, 2e
édition, Geneva, Zurich and Basel 2006, Nos.
708-709, pp. 448-449.
20 Gérard Piquerez, Traité de droit pénal suisse, 2e
édition, Geneva, Zurich and Basel 2006, No. 710,
pp. 450-451.
21 See for example the judgment of the Federal
Tribunal (ATF) 127 I 38, 40-41 consid. 2a.
22 See for example ATF 129 I 8, 9 consid. 2.1.
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23 Julien Lhuillier, Anne-Sophie Peron-Verloove, p.
315.
24 In practice, the documents or recordings are
placed in an envelope under seal or in a sealed
container.
25 Memory with the properties of live memory, but
with no disappearance of data in the event of
power loss.
26 Standard live memory. The content is lost when it
is no longer connected to the mains.
27 For an extensive discussion on this topic, see
Electronic Evidence, Chapter 3.
28 Message concerning the Council of Europe
Convention on Cybercrime, p. 25.
consent of the beneficial owner. It can be aimed, in
particular, at documents (hard copies) and recordings
(for instance electronic storage) in order to determine
whether, in the interests of the inquiry, their seizure
would be justified. Under the Swiss Code of Criminal
Procedure, it rests with the Public Prosecutor to order
searches. However, in situations where there is danger
in delay, the police are also competent to order a search
(section 241(3) CCP).
Wherever possible, a backup copy should be made
directly after searching computer equipment. It is
advisable to protect against any preinstalled
programme on the machine that can be activated
remotely to wipe out data.23 
Before the search takes place, the holder of the
documents can offer an explanation about the contents
of the documents and recordings that are to the subject
of the search. He can also object to the search, for
example by stating that the recordings are covered by
professional confidentiality or by establishing his
personal relations with the accused. In such a case, the
Public Prosecutor or the police must follow the
procedure known as “placing under seal” (section 248
CCP).24 This procedure prohibits the Public Prosecutor
from examining and using the documents and
recordings placed under seal, and grants him 20 days in
which to apply to the court for an order to remove the
seals. The court must rule on the matter within one
month. Its decision is final.
The placing under seal needs some explanation.
Although many electronic storage media do not pose
any particular problems for this procedure, there are
others which cause a few technical concerns. These can
involve outdated as well as more avant-gardist
technology. For instance, where the device is powered
off, this does not appear to be problematic. However, if
the investigating authorities were dealing with a PDA
which does not use flash memory,25 and only has RAM,26
for example running under Windows Mobile 2003, by
leaving the device unplugged there is a significant risk
of irremediable loss of data. When the device is
switched on, the data that the investigating authority
wants to analyse will probably have disappeared. If the
device is plugged in, it could become even more
problematic. If, for analysis reasons, the device needs to
be kept switched on (problem of access code or RAM
capture), either a plug has to be taken out of the packet
under seal in order to maintain the power connection
and ensure that the plug remains correctly in place, or
an investigation has to be conducted in situ, which can
create difficulties in terms of the competency of the
personnel, equipment or time.27 Unfortunately, these
problems can build up. If the device remains switched
on, measures must be taken to ensure that the data
stored on it cannot be deleted or reset remotely. This
would require placing the object under seal in a Faraday
cage, a practice which is not necessarily well known or
mastered by all the participants involved in a search,
and which requires the proper equipment.
From the legal point of view, the provisions on search
in the CCP will satisfy article 19(1) and (3) of the Council
of Europe Convention on Cybercrime, which requires
States to provide measures to enable authorities to
search and seize recorded computer data and data
storage media.28 
In the case of international mutual assistance in
criminal matters, the issue may be whether a foreign
request, for example to save traffic or content data, can
be executed rapidly. This question is relevant for anyone
who is familiar with the slow pace of certain procedures.
Under the current statutory provisions, the Swiss
authority requested by a foreign authority to rapidly
execute, for example, a search for documents, can act
by means of interim measures (article 18 IMAC).
However, the foreign authority, within a period set by
the Swiss authority, must file a formal request for
assistance, thereby confirming and completing the
request for interim measures.
An alternative to search: obligation to deposit (section
265 CCP, “Obligation to hand over items and assets”) 
In accordance with the proportionality principle,
coercive measures using force will only be employed if
the investigating authority cannot obtain the object in
any other way. For this reason, the CCP provides for the
person under investigation to voluntarily deposit the
object at the behest of the authority. However, this
possibility is only granted in cases where there is no
risk that a warning of the measure will cause it to fail
(where the person under investigation may collude with
others or might conceal the objects). In practice, it
involves an order being served on the presumed holder
to deposit a document or a recording within a given
time, on pain of a criminal sanction for failing to comply
with a decision of the investigating authority, or a
disciplinary fine (section 265(3) CCP).
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The obligation to deposit does not apply to the
accused who cannot be compelled to actively implicate
himself, or to persons who have the right to refuse to
deposit or give evidence (section 265(2)(a) and (b) CCP).
This provision applies to a third party who has
information that is useful to the inquiry. In the
computing field, an example of this would be an
obligation order for eBay to deposit hard copies and
computer-data storage media that would enable the
identification of a thief who used the platform to steal
from his victims.
The obligation to deposit in section 265 CCP is
compatible with article 18 of the Council of Europe
Convention on Cybercrime, which stipulates that the
investigating authority must be able to compel anyone
to submit stored computer data in his possession or
control.29 The question of seizure will now be
considered.
Seizure (sections 263-268 CCP) 
Search is very often accompanied by a subsequent
measure – seizure – which is the “temporary withdrawal
of the right to make use or to dispose of a thing”.30
Seizure does automatically follow on from a search,
since the documents and recordings can be
spontaneously handed over to the investigators. Under
the provisions of the CCP, it rests with the Public
Prosecutor to order seizures, subject to situations of
danger in delay. In the latter cases, the police or even
individuals also have this power (section 263(3) CCP). In
the case of individuals, it is only a provisional measure,
in the sense that the Public Prosecutor must formally
order the seizure.
The seizure can cover various objects, particularly
evidence and objects that are likely to be confiscated
(section 263(1)(a) and (d) CCP). In the computer field,
any electronic information that can be used as proof in a
judicial matter will be qualified as evidence. The
investigators will, in particular, examine information
media and network traffic. Objects that must be
confiscated are notably those that have been used to
commit offences. Thus, the computer of a specialist in
internet fraud can be seized, both as evidence and as an
object that must be confiscated (a tool used in the
offence). As in the case of a search, an objection to
seizure triggers the procedure of “placing under seal”.
This subject is covered in the section on search.
The Council of Europe Convention on Cybercrime also
suggests another type of seizure – the obligation
imposed on a third party to preserve data. Swiss law
partly meets this requirement to the extent that article
15(3) of the Law on Postal Service and
Telecommunications Surveillance (LSCPT)31 imposes on
Internet Service Providers (ISPs) the obligation to
preserve traffic and billing data for a period of six
months. Only ISPs are subject to this obligation.
Real time collection of traffic data (sections 269-281
CCP) 
Swiss law authorises the law enforcement authorities to
collect traffic, billing and content data in real time.
Traffic and billing data can be solicited in cases
involving crimes or misdemeanours pursuant to section
273 CCP, while content data can only be solicited in
connection with the offences mentioned in section 269
CCP (particularly serious offences). Article 21 of the
Council of Europe Convention on Cybercrime requires
States to adopt measures to allow the collection of
content data “in relation to a range of serious offences
to be determined by domestic law”. Consequently, the
Convention does not require Switzerland to expand or
reduce the list of offences in which the law enforcement
authorities are permitted to use such a surveillance
measure.
Recommendations of the International
Organization on Computer Evidence (IOCE)
on the Collection and Use of Electronic
Evidence 
According to the information on its web site, the
International Organization on Computer Evidence (IOCE)
is an international forum that enables law enforcement
agencies to exchange information and knowledge
concerning computer investigation and digital forensic
issues. To ensure the reliability of digital evidence, the
IOCE encourages States to respect certain general
principles. It is interesting to note that while these
principles do not constitute legal rules, they allow, from
a technical point of view, the positive realisation of
precautions that should be taken during computer
related investigations. These principles are as follows:
1. All of the general forensic and procedural principles
29 Message concerning the Council of Europe
Convention on Cybercrime, p. 24.
30 Message concerning the unification of criminal
procedure law, p. 1227.
31 RS 780.1.
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32 For a list of other recommendations respecting
the handling of digital evidence, see the list in
Appendix 1 to Electronic Evidence.
33 An encrypted container is a virtual volume which
exists in the form of an encrypted file and can be
read by appropriate software.
must be applied.
2. Upon seizing digital evidence, actions taken should
not change that evidence (integrity).
3. When it is necessary for a person to obtain access to
digital evidence, that person should be trained for the
purpose.
4. All activity relating to the seizure, access, storage or
transfer of digital evidence must be fully documented,
preserved and available for review.
5. An individual is responsible for all actions taken with
respect to digital evidence whilst the digital evidence
is in their possession.
6. Any agency, which is responsible for seizing,
accessing, storing or transferring digital evidence is
responsible for compliance with these principles.
These recommendations are very useful, but they
cannot and can never be applied to the letter.32 It is
possible to spend a great deal of time focusing on and
defending form over substance. Good investigation
practices can change rapidly and, in certain
circumstances, by applying them too rigidly, essential
evidence can be lost. For example, in cases where the
justice system investigates encrypted containers,33 the
most efficient way to obtain the data is to copy them
when their volumes have mounted (that is when the
volumes are installed for use by the encrypting
software) and they are therefore readable. This requires
intervention on the incriminated machine and,
inevitably, the electronic evidence will be modified by
the investigator. Obviously, the investigator must make
a report of what he does and to comply with the spirit of
the relevant recommendations. In theory, therefore,
everything will be in order, but in realty it does not
necessarily follow that all the technical details are
sufficiently clear for most law officers. It will then be
easy to confuse the issue and to try to cast doubt on the
quality of the investigation by relying on known and
published rules, which are not understood in detail.
Conclusion 
Investigations in the computer world have specific
characteristics with regard to collecting and using
evidence. Even though these measures are based on
ordinary provisions of the Code of Criminal Procedure,
“technical” guidelines must also be observed,
particularly to prevent the evidence from being modified
during collection.
According to the Federal Government’s conclusions,
the Swiss legal provisions comply with the requirements
of the Council of Europe Convention of Cybercrime. The
Swiss Parliament has made a few amendments to the
Penal Code and the Federal Law on International Mutual
Aid in Criminal Matters (section 143bis PC and section
18b IMAC). On the organisational level, the Federal
Administration (Fedpol/FJO) will also need to increase
the numbers of people employed to a certain extent. 
The next step would be to prepare a treaty on the
international level, drawing inspiration notably from the
United Nations Convention against Corruption. Cyber
crime is too much of a global threat to be tackled on the
regional level. The present process of ratification of the
Council of Europe Convention represents a step in the
right direction. However, a legal text is only of value if it
is applied effectively, and with the necessary means, by
all those who are responsible for its implementation.
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